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Against Reflective Equilibrium

One standard in ethics: Rawls’ reflective equilibrium idea
‘one may think of moral theory at first [...] as the attempt to describe our moral capacity [...] what is required is a formulation of a set of principles which, when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances, would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons were we to apply these principles conscientiously and intelligently’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 41); see Singer (1974) for critical discussion.

‘one may think of physical moral theory at first [...]
as the attempt to describe our moralperceptual capacity

Interesting: seems like Rawls’ project requires the methods of psychology (and is moral psychology)

[...]

what is required is

a formulation of a set of principles which,

when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances,

would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons

were we to apply these principles’

Rawls, 1999 p. 41

The idea of moral theory as an attempt to describe our moral capacity is great. The problem is thinking this can be done by characterising the judgements.
Given multiple moral foundations, or multiple processes, we would not necessarily expect a consistent set of principles. Indeed it is unclear that logical consistency in ethics is particularly valuable.

1. Ethical judgements are explained by a dual-process theory, which distinguishes faster from slower processes.

2. Faster processes are unreliable in unfamiliar* situations.

3. Therefore, we should not rely on faster process in unfamiliar* situations.

4. When philosophers rely on not-justified-inferentially premises, they are relying on faster processes.

5. We have reason to suspect that the moral scenarios and principles philosophers consider involve unfamiliar* situations.

6. Therefore, not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios, and debatable principles, cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.

recall: speed vs accuracy trade-offs

Any broadly inferential process has to make a trade-off between speed and accuracy

wicked learning environments

‘When a person’s past experience is both representative of the situation relevant to the decision and supported by much , trust the intuition; when it is not, be careful’

(Hogarth, 2010, p. 343).

Earlier I suggested that it’s clear that the cases philosophers study are unlikely to meet these criteria. They are interested in cases which are unusual and edge cases, so probably fit neither criterion (representative and feedback).
In the case of principles, I think it is unclear how we would establish whether past experience could be representative.
The thing about fast processes is that they gain speed by trading flexibility. So the principles that underpin them are supposed to be reliably correct in familiar cases only; any correctness beyond that is accidental.
You get feedback on cases, not principles.

dilemma

If your not-justified-inferentially judgements concerns only familiar situations, we don’t need it (we have the fast processes for that).

If your not-justified-inferentially judgements concerns unfamiliar situations, we have reason to reject it.

1. Ethical judgements are explained by a dual-process theory, which distinguishes faster from slower processes.

2. Faster processes are unreliable in unfamiliar* situations.

3. Therefore, we should not rely on faster process in unfamiliar* situations.

4. When philosophers rely on not-justified-inferentially premises, they are relying on faster processes.

5. We have reason to suspect that the moral scenarios and principles philosophers consider involve unfamiliar* situations.

6. Therefore, not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios, and debatable principles, cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.

but where does this leave reflective equilibrium?
One standard in ethics: Rawls’ reflective equilibrium idea
‘one may think of moral theory at first [...] as the attempt to describe our moral capacity [...] what is required is a formulation of a set of principles which, when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances, would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons were we to apply these principles conscientiously and intelligently’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 41); see Singer (1974) for critical discussion.

‘one may think of physical moral theory at first [...]
as the attempt to describe our moralperceptual capacity

Interesting: seems like Rawls’ project requires the methods of psychology (and is moral psychology)

[...]

what is required is

a formulation of a set of principles which,

when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances,

would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons

were we to apply these principles’

Rawls, 1999 p. 41

The idea of moral theory as an attempt to describe our moral capacity is great. The problem is thinking this can be done by characterising the judgements.
Given multiple moral foundations, or multiple processes, we would not necessarily expect a consistent set of principles. Indeed it is unclear that logical consistency in ethics is particularly valuable.

Dilemma for Rawls’ Reflective Equilibrium

Horn 1 : If you include not-justified-inferentially judgements about, or with implications for, unfamiliar* situations, you are not justified in starting there.

Horn 2 : If you include only not-justified-inferentially judgements about familiar* situations, you are not justified in generalising from them.

Because speed-accuracy trade off ...
amount to a generalisation of principles implicit in how fast processes handle familiar situations which allows us to apply those same principles in unfamiliar situations.
Reflective equilibrium might be interesting for all kinds of reasons (just as impetus mechanics is). But it is not a reliable method of discovering ethical truths.
And this conclusion is significant because ...
This is the encyclopedia

‘Reflective equilibrium is the dominant method in moral and political philosophy’

(Knight, 2023)

‘this method, properly understood, is [...] the best way of making up one’s mind about moral matters [...]. Indeed, it is the only defensible method: apparent alternatives to it are illusory.’

(Scanlon, 2002, p. 149)

image source: bing ai (https://www.bing.com/images/create/someone-experiencing-philosophical-doubt-in-the-st/1-65e5b2a124f642c1b4fe68c6686e130f?id=08sBu7s95CjozOCZJ4FVig%3d%3d&view=detailv2&idpp=genimg&idpclose=1&thId=OIG1.QOxbHvVI2ce3CSYH_nao&FORM=SYDBIC)

But are you sure that ethical intuitions can be wrong?

‘a theory of justice is [...] a theory [...] setting out the principles governing our moral powers’

(Rawls, 1999, p. 44)

I’m always interested to know who we are. Am I included? Are you?
Let’s suppose Rawls means living humans. (Not the history of our species, but also not just Rawls and his readers.)
Then it looks like there’s a sense in ethical intuitions cannot be wrong. This can be clarified by thinking about a comparison he draws ...
THis comes immediately after the initial stateement of reflective equilibrium

‘A useful comparison here is with the problem of describing the sense of grammaticalness that we have for the sentences of our native language. [footnote: Chomsky]’

(Rawls, 1999, p. 41)

Maybe also worth noting that some passages about grammar have been removed from the second edition.

Which comparison?

Ethics vs Physics

Not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.

Extension to not-justified-inferentially premises generally?

‘debilitating pain is, other things equal, a bad thing, to be avoided or alleviated’ (Railton, 2014, p. 814)

Ethics vs Linguistics

1. we also have fast processes which give rise to linguistic intuitions

Implies a form of infallibility.

Premises about judgements about particular moral scenarios need to be supported by carefully controlled experiments if they are to be used in ethical arguments where the aim is to establish knowledge of their conclusions.

What does infallibility mean? 2. there is no interesting sense in which the principles governing the fast processes behind linguistic intuitions can be wrong. (Because there is nothing for them to answer to.)
3. In case #2 is too quick, we can say that they can be better or worse in enabling more or less sophisticated forms of communication (limits on the language of those who have been linguistically deprived in their early years, Senghas on profoundly deaf children of hearing parents etc); and they can match or fail to match those of others around us.
image source: bing ai (https://www.bing.com/images/create/someone-experiencing-philosophical-doubt-in-the-st/1-65e5b2a124f642c1b4fe68c6686e130f?id=08sBu7s95CjozOCZJ4FVig%3d%3d&view=detailv2&idpp=genimg&idpclose=1&thId=OIG1.QOxbHvVI2ce3CSYH_nao&FORM=SYDBIC)

But are you sure that ethical intuitions can be wrong?

And even if they can, does the loose reconstruction of Greene’s argument lead to a good objection to reflective equilibrium?