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One standard in ethics: Rawls’ reflective equilibrium idea
 
‘one may think of moral theory at first [...] as the attempt to describe our moral capacity [...] what is required is a formulation of a set of principles which, when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances, would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons were we to apply these principles conscientiously and intelligently’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 41); see Singer (1974) for critical discussion.
 
Interesting: seems like Rawls’ project requires the methods of psychology (and is moral psychology)
 
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The idea of moral theory as an attempt to describe our moral capacity is great. The problem is thinking this can be done by characterising the judgements.
 
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Given multiple moral foundations, or multiple processes, we would not necessarily expect a consistent set of principles. Indeed it is unclear that logical consistency in ethics is particularly valuable.
 
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Any broadly inferential process has to make a trade-off between speed and accuracy
 
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Earlier I suggested that it’s clear that the cases philosophers study are unlikely to meet these criteria. They are interested in cases which are unusual and edge cases, so probably fit neither criterion (representative and feedback).
 
In the case of principles, I think it is unclear how we would establish whether past experience could be representative.
 
The thing about fast processes is that they gain speed by trading flexibility. So the principles that underpin them are supposed to be reliably correct in familiar cases only; any correctness beyond that is accidental.
 
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You get feedback on cases, not principles.
 
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but where does this leave reflective equilibrium?
 
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\subsection{slide-20}
One standard in ethics: Rawls’ reflective equilibrium idea
 
‘one may think of moral theory at first [...] as the attempt to describe our moral capacity [...] what is required is a formulation of a set of principles which, when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances, would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons were we to apply these principles conscientiously and intelligently’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 41); see Singer (1974) for critical discussion.
 
Interesting: seems like Rawls’ project requires the methods of psychology (and is moral psychology)
 
The idea of moral theory as an attempt to describe our moral capacity is great. The problem is thinking this can be done by characterising the judgements.
 
Given multiple moral foundations, or multiple processes, we would not necessarily expect a consistent set of principles. Indeed it is unclear that logical consistency in ethics is particularly valuable.
 
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Because speed-accuracy trade off ...
 
amount to a generalisation of principles implicit in how fast processes handle familiar situations which allows us to apply those same principles in unfamiliar situations.
 
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Reflective equilibrium might be interesting for all kinds of reasons (just as impetus mechanics is). But it is not a reliable method of discovering ethical truths.
 
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And this conclusion is significant because ...
 
This is the encyclopedia
 
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image source: bing ai (https://www.bing.com/images/create/someone-experiencing-philosophical-doubt-in-the-st/1-65e5b2a124f642c1b4fe68c6686e130f?id=08sBu7s95CjozOCZJ4FVig%3d%3d\&view=detailv2\&idpp=genimg\&idpclose=1\&thId=OIG1.QOxbHvVI2ce3CSYH_nao\&FORM=SYDBIC)
 
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I’m always interested to know who we are. Am I included? Are you?
 
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Let’s suppose Rawls means living humans. (Not the history of our species, but also not just Rawls and his readers.)
 
Then it looks like there’s a sense in ethical intuitions cannot be wrong. This can be clarified by thinking about a comparison he draws ...
 
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THis comes immediately after the initial stateement of reflective equilibrium
 
Maybe also worth noting that some passages about grammar have been removed from the second edition.
 
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1. we also have fast processes which give rise to linguistic intuitions
 
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What does infallibility mean? 2. there is no interesting sense in which the principles governing the fast processes behind linguistic intuitions can be wrong. (Because there is nothing for them to answer to.)
 
3. In case #2 is too quick, we can say that they can be better or worse in enabling more or less sophisticated forms of communication (limits on the language of those who have been linguistically deprived in their early years, Senghas on profoundly deaf children of hearing parents etc); and they can match or fail to match those of others around us.
 
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\subsection{slide-38}
image source: bing ai (https://www.bing.com/images/create/someone-experiencing-philosophical-doubt-in-the-st/1-65e5b2a124f642c1b4fe68c6686e130f?id=08sBu7s95CjozOCZJ4FVig%3d%3d\&view=detailv2\&idpp=genimg\&idpclose=1\&thId=OIG1.QOxbHvVI2ce3CSYH_nao\&FORM=SYDBIC)
 
‘one may think of moral theory at first [...] as the attempt to describe our moral capacity [...] what is required is a formulation of a set of principles which, when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances, would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons were we to apply these principles conscientiously and intelligently’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 41); see Singer (1974) for critical discussion.
 
‘one may think of moral theory at first [...] as the attempt to describe our moral capacity [...] what is required is a formulation of a set of principles which, when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances, would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons were we to apply these principles conscientiously and intelligently’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 41); see Singer (1974) for critical discussion.
 

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