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Moral Reframing and Process Dissociation

We encountered puzzles

which we are now in a position to resolve.

ok, now I come to the puzzles
This is an application of the dual-process theory.

puzzle

If the evidence for cultural variation in moral psychology is at best weak,
and if the theoretical argument for moral reframing is flawed,
why does moral reframing seem to work?

We already saw some candidate explanations. Now that we have understood process dissociation, we can introduce an additional candidate answer. (This is compatible with the others.)

Why does moral reframing work?

standard explanation

1. There is cultural variation in moral foundations that is linked to political ideology.

2. Reframing engages the morals of the target culture.

3. Moral engagement influences action.

objection A: evidence for (1)

objection B: Lars-Joan-Joseph

alternative explanations

apparent message source

familiarity of word choices

...

These are also not super well supported explanations,
and their truth would imply that moral reframing doesn’t really work at all (it only appears to work because content and source are confounded)

Graham et al, 2009 figure 1

The Joan-Lars-Joseph objection

The evidence on cultural variation says socially conservative participants tend to regard all five foundations as roughly equally morally relevant.

Gawronski et al, 2017 figure 1

Luke & Gawronski (2021, p. figure 2 (part))

‘on average, conservatives are less inclined to accept harmful actions for the greater good than liberals.

[And] liberals are more sensitive to the consequences of a given action for the greater good than conservatives’

(Luke & Gawronski, 2021, p. 10).

‘You can make a difference by recyling because you know it’s the right thing to do. Your actions can help care for others and allow the greatest good for society. Because of people like you, we can reduce the harm to others and to the environment by recycling. You CAN make a difference’

‘You can join the fight by recycling with those like you in your community. Your actions can help us do our civic duty because recycling is the responsible thing to do in our society. Because of people like you, we can follow the advice of important leaders by recycling. You CAN join the fight!’

puzzle

If the evidence for cultural variation in moral psychology is at best weak,
and if the theoretical argument for moral reframing is flawed,
why does moral reframing seem to work?

Now that we have understood process dissociation, we have a better idea about the puzzle.
Now we have evidence from MFQ-2 together with process dissociation. These are based on entirely different theoretical ideas but explain the same data.
So I want to say that the answer to the puzzle is that the evidence is not weak any more—it was weak, and so it was a lucky guess that moral reframing would work. But now we have a sounder evidential basis for it.