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Why Is Moral Dumbfounding Significant?

why is moral dumbfounding relevant?

First idea: linguistic analogy

moral intuition

‘the mind contains a moral grammar: a complex and possibly domain-specific set of rules [...] this system enables individuals to determine the deontic status of an infinite variety of acts and omissions’

(Mikhail, 2007, p. 144)

Researchers who consider various analogies between linguistic and ethical abilities include Roedder & Harman (2010), Mikhail (2007), and Dwyer (2009).

linguistic intuition

linguistic competence involves a special-purpose module

which operates according to linguistic rules

First idea: there is a moral grammar
Second idea: the moral grammar is in the mind, as a module (not as a body of knowledge)

‘linguistics—a domain in which ordinary human beings are also famously dumbfounded.’

Dwyer (2009, p. 279)

argument?

‘Moral Dumbfounding suggests two desiderata for an adequate account of moral judgment; namely, it: \begin{quote} (a) must not entail what is patently false, namely, that such judgments are the conclusions of explicitly represented syllogisms, one or more premises of which are moral principles, that ordinary folk can articulate, and (b) must accommodate subjects’ grasp of the structure of the scenes they evaluate.’ \end{quote} ‘The Linguistic Analogy, which [... holds that [ethical] judgments are reflective of the structure of the Moral Faculty, satisfies these desiderata’ (Dwyer, 2009, p. 294).

‘Moral Dumbfounding suggests two desiderata for an adequate account of moral judgment; namely, it:

(a) must not entail what is patently false, namely, that such judgments are the conclusions of explicitly represented syllogisms, one or more premises of which are moral principles, that ordinary folk can articulate, and

(b) must accommodate subjects’ grasp of the structure of the scenes they evaluate.’

‘The Linguistic Analogy, which [... holds that [ethical] judgments are reflective of the structure of the Moral Faculty, satisfies these desiderata.’

Dwyer 2009, p. 294

This seems not to follow from dumbfounding at all, but from reflection on patterns of judgement (see the discussion of Mikhail from the last lecture).
go back to the evidence on dumbfounding ...

How well does the evidence support Dwyer’s position?

(Never trust a philospoher!)

Complication: Dwyer cites ‘Haidt’s (2001) study’ but this is actually a review paper.

Dwyer probably intends to refer to Haidt et al, 2000.

From the abstract:

‘It was hypothesized that participants’ judgments

would be highly consistent with their reasoning on the moral reasoning dilemma, but that

judgment would separate from reason and follow intuition in the other four tasks.’

So far this is consistent with Dwyer’s view, but ...
Why other?
This part does not appear to be consistent with her view at all. It implies we are back to the dual process view after all.
NB: Dwyer is explicitly attacking the dual process view!
Key Disanalogy with language: ethical reasoning seems important for exercising some ethical abilities
[topic: moral reasoning. Hindriks 2015?]

‘Moral Dumbfounding suggests two desiderata for an adequate account of moral judgment; namely, it:

(a) must not entail what is patently false, namely, that such judgments are the conclusions of explicitly represented syllogisms, one or more premises of which are moral principles, that ordinary folk can articulate, and

(b) must accommodate subjects’ grasp of the structure of the scenes they evaluate.’

‘The Linguistic Analogy, which [... holds that [ethical] judgments are reflective of the structure of the Moral Faculty, satisfies these desiderata.’

Dwyer 2009, p. 294

‘Moral Dumbfounding suggests two desiderata for an adequate account of moral judgment; namely, it:

(a) must not entail what is patently false, namely, that such judgments are the conclusions of explicitly represented syllogisms, one or more premises of which are moral principles, that ordinary folk can articulate, and

(b) must accommodate subjects’ grasp of the structure of the scenes they evaluate.’

‘The Linguistic Analogy, which [... holds that [ethical] judgments are reflective of the structure of the Moral Faculty, satisfies these desiderata.’

Dwyer 2009, p. 294

?

The question was whether I am reading too much into Heinz.
Moral dumbfounding does not suggest this!
Not everyone agrees, but my take is that there is no absolute state of being utterly morally dumbfounded; or if there is, it doesn't matter very much.
What’s important is that people are sometimes more dumbfounded and sometimes less; and, although we do find cultural differences, there are patterns in which moral dilemmas dumbfound people.
Only orange for now; will be red when we consider moral disengagement

why is moral dumbfounding relevant? (II)

Claims rejecting a role for reason in moral judgements.

Prinz’ conclucions from moral dumbfounding:

‘If we ask people why they hold a particular moral view [their] reasons are often superficial and post hoc. If the reasons are successfully challenged, the moral judgment often remains.’

(Prinz, 2007, p. 32).

‘It was hypothesized that participants’ judgments would be highly consistent with their reasoning on the moral reasoning dilemma, but that judgment would separate from reason and follow intuition in the four tasks.’

(Haidt, Bjorklund, & Murphy, 2000)

NB: the scenarios for moral dumbfounding are carefully constructed to resist the kind of explanation that people of a particular culture are most likely to try to invoke.

!?

Hilariously, Prinz (2007) goes so far as to offer five candidate explanations for the results of the dumbfounding experiment. Which he does not appear to have actually read.
Recall from earlier ...

How, if at all, does a person’s reasoning influence their moral judgements?

moral ‘judgments are [not] the conclusions of explicitly represented syllogisms, one or more premises of which are moral principles, that ordinary folk can articulate.’ (Dwyer, 2009, p. 294)

‘moral reasoning is [...] usually engaged in after a moral judgment is made, in which a person searches for arguments that will support an already-made judgment’ (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, p. 189).

‘If we ask people why they hold a particular moral view [their] reasons are often superficial and post hoc. [...] basic values are implemented in our psychology in a way that puts them outside certain practices of justification’ (Prinz, 2007, p. 32).

intuition

-> judgement

-> reasoning

evidence?

What does moral dumbfounding actually show?

My view.

Moral dumbfounding shows that some ethical judgements are not consequences of reasoning from known principles

Other phenomena (e.g. moral disengagement) indicate that some ethical judgements are consequences of reasoning from known principles

preview

moral dumbfounding

sometimes, not always:

intuition

-> judgement

-> reasoning

moral disengagement

sometimes:

(intuition

->) reasoning

-> judgement

The important thing for me isn’t whether you find the argument compelling or not. There’s surely much more to say. It’s that the motivating for it gives us a good question, a puzzle even.

puzzle

Why are moral judgements sometimes, but not always, a consequence of reasoning from known principles?

This is what dumbfounding shows.
This is coming next (moral disengagement)