Keyboard Shortcuts?f

×
  • Next step
  • Previous step
  • Skip this slide
  • Previous slide
  • mShow slide thumbnails
  • nShow notes
  • hShow handout latex source
  • NShow talk notes latex source

Click here and press the right key for the next slide.

(This may not work on mobile or ipad. You can try using chrome or firefox, but even that may fail. Sorry.)

also ...

Press the left key to go backwards (or swipe right)

Press n to toggle whether notes are shown (or add '?notes' to the url before the #)

Press m or double tap to slide thumbnails (menu)

Press ? at any time to show the keyboard shortcuts

 

Moral Disengagement: Significance

 

Moral Disengagement: Significance

[email protected]

In moral disengagement there is anticipation of self-inflicted punishment

which triggers reasoning

that influences moral judgements and actions.

‘basic values are [...] outside certain practices of justification [...] basic values seem to be implemented in an emotional way’ (Prinz, 2007, p. 32).

‘moral reasoning is [...] usually engaged in after a moral judgment is made, in which a person searches for arguments that will support an already-made judgment’ (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, p. 189).

Moral judgements are not ‘the conclusions of explicitly represented syllogisms, one or more premises of which are moral principles, that ordinary folk can articulate’ (Dwyer, 2009, p. 294).

this is just a preview, no explanation given
The key objection is that reasoning can support deontological judgements no less than consequentialist ones. (See also (Holyoak & Powell, 2016) who argue for the same conclusion on the basis of different considerations.)

Characteristically deontological judgments are preferentially supported by automatic emotional [processes], while characteristically consequentialist judgments are preferentially supported by conscious reasoning and allied processes of cognitive control’ (Greene, 2014, p. 699)

Further significance: We also have evidence for the 'sometimes' part

puzzle

Why are moral judgements sometimes, but not always, a consequence of reasoning from known principles?

Can strengthen this by considering moral disengagement.