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The Puzzle of Moral Foundations Theory

puzzle

If the evidence for cultural variation in moral psychology is at best weak,
and if the theoretical argument for moral reframing is flawed,
why does moral reframing seem to work?

The scalar invariance and Lars-et-al puzzles are nicely complementary: if the first fails and the evidence *is* correct, then the second objection gets you.

1. ‘Moral convictions and the emotions they evoke shape political attitudes’

2. There are at least two fundamental domains of human morality, including harm and purity.

3. ‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’

4. ‘liberals express greater levels of environmental concern than do conservatives in part because liberals are more likely to view environmental issues in moral terms.’

5. ‘exposing conservatives to proenvironmental appeals based on moral concerns that uniquely resonate with them will lead them to view the environment in moral terms and be more supportive of proenvironmental efforts.’

The standard explanation. Only known to work if MFQ-1-based findings can be trusted. Which they cannot. (NB: THis doesn’t mean we can rule the explanation out, only that we have no reason to accept it.)
These authors also mention two further factors: fluency and source.

‘Why does moral reframing work? The primary explanation is that morally reframed messages are influential because targets perceive a “match” between their moral convictions and the argument’ (Feinberg & Willer, 2019, p. 4).

Why does perceiving a match increase willingness to mitigate climate change?

Feinberg & Willer (2013): because it increases the probability that you will think of climate change as an ethical issue.

And now you can see why those objections matter.
Theoretically, if conservatives give equal weight to harm and purity, framing climate change in terms of purity rather than harm should not change the probability that they will think of climate change as a moral issue.
And if the MFQ-1 questionnaire used in all these surveys is not measurement invariant, then we cannot be sure that conservatives differ from liberals in putting less weight on harm and more weight on purity and authority: in which case they may not be perceiving a greater match at all.

?

can we turn the argument around?

1. Moral reframing works

therefore:

2. Conservatives differ from liberals in placing more weight on binding foundations and less weight on individualizing foundations.

My view: this argument will only work if there is no other possible explanation for why moral reframing works.
What drives the effects?

Could we explain the observed effects on attitudes and actions
without appeal to the claim that framing influences how strongly you perceive climate change as an ethical issue
(and so without invoking Moral Foundations Theory)?

candidate explanation: message source

(Fielding, Hornsey, Thai, & Toh, 2020)

Maybe people are more likely to act when a message is framed in terms of care or purity because they identify the message as coming from their own in-group?
[They claim to compare source of message with content but they FUBAR content (see commented out slides above, so just present them as giving evidence that message source can be influential)]

Fielding et al. (2020, p. figure 1)

Asked about support for carbon tax; then shown article about carbon tax being endorsed by either Rep or Dem; then asked again about support for carbon tax.
‘this is the first research to test whether messages about climate change that come from political ingroup members can positively influence responses to climate change policy.’ (Fielding et al., 2020).
Add a slide opposing this: ‘conservatives high in Fairness are more supportive of policies proposed by President Obama than liberals who are low in Fairness’ (Miles, 2016, p. 486). Can also use their figures!

‘it is possible that the values framing in past studies worked because it provided conservatives with information about the source of the message: when messages aligned with conservative values, Republicans [conservatives] filled in the gaps and simply presumed that the message came from a Republican source’ (Fielding et al., 2020, p. 196).

candidate explanation: message source

(Fielding et al., 2020)

additional support comes from pope-prime ...
Indirect evidence comes from the effect of the pope-prime ...

Schuldt et al, 2017

‘A nationally representative survey of 1212 U.S. adults was fielded online by GfK (formerly KnowledgeNetworks) between April 15 and May 1, 2016, approximately 11 months after the release of the encyclical and 7 months after the pope’s U.S. visit.’

How much do you know about Pope Francis’ views on climate change? [inexact wording]

‘Do you consider climate change to be a moral or ethical issue?’

Results

‘Whereas a minority (46%) of respondents reported perceiving climate change as a moral issue in the control condition, this figure rose to 51% among those in the pope prime condition’ (Schuldt, Pearson, Romero-Canyas, & Larson-Konar, 2017).

‘the pope prime exerted a stronger effect on the moral beliefs of Republicans: 30% of Republicans in the control group reported perceiving climate change as a moral issue compared to 39% of Republicans in the pope prime condition, X2(469) = 4.32, p = .04. By comparison, Democrats were equally likely to report perceiving climate change as a moral or ethical issue regardless of condition (61% vs. 58% in the treatment versus control group, respectively), X2 (662) = .57, p=.45.’

‘the pope prime exerted a stronger effect on the moral beliefs of Republicans

‘Democrats were equally likely to report perceiving climate change as a moral or ethical issue regardless of condition’

Why does moral reframing work?

The primary explanation is that morally reframed messages are influential because targets perceive a “match” between their moral convictions and the argument in favor of the other side’s policy position’ (Feinberg & Willer, 2019, p. 4).

Evidence: Wolsko (2017)

Morally reframed messages provide cues about the source of the message, and people are more influenced by messages from members of their own ingroups.

Evidence: Fielding et al. (2020); Hurst & Stern (2020)

Let’s consider another possibility for matching ...

Why might a match matter?

1. Increases the probability of you seeing the issue in ethical terms?

2. Increases fluency of processing?

fluency. Perhaps MFT is not the right explanation and the difference is some more superficial cultural variation?
‘the persuasiveness of a message is enhanced when it fits with the observer’s mental representational state (Schwarz and Clore 1983). When encountering information that is consistent with their beliefs, values, and opinions, individuals are likely to experience a feeling of fluency or ease of comprehension, generating a “feels right” experience (Reber, Schwarz, and Winkielman 2004). Similar to positive affect (Cesario, Grant, and Higgins 2004), in which individuals feel a generalized state of emotional arousal, fluency additionally engenders a feeling that something “just fits” by feeling genuine and desirable (Lee and Aaker 2004). Moreover, Kim et al. (2009) suggest that this feeling “right” elicits more favorable evaluations of a message because individuals misattribute their feeling-right experience to the quality of the persuasive message’ (Kidwell, Farmer, & Hardesty, 2013, p. .352)

Kidwell et al, 2013 figure 1

Fluency matters for

familiarity judgements

agency judgements

surprise judgements

...

fluency. Perhaps MFT is not the right explanation and the difference is some more superficial cultural variation?

Kidwell et al, 2013 figure 1

objection

We saw earlier that mere beliefs, even strongly held ones, have little influence on behaviour (e.g. climate sceptics), but that moral convictions have greater influence on behaviour.

fluency might influence whether you believe
but not whether you have a moral conviction

Why might a match matter?

1. Increases the probability of you seeing the issue in ethical terms?

2. Increases fluency of processing?

I was asking ...

Could we explain the observed effects on attitudes and actions
without appeal to cultural variation in moral concerns
(and so without invoking Moral Foundations Theory)?

To the extent we think fluency (and perhaps other cognitive factors) drive the effect, we might be agnostic about whether what lies behind fluency is a deep cultural difference or a relatively superficial divide in terms of how things are phrased in different groups.

moral reframing may be effective because

- it indicates a source

- it enhances fluency

- ...

Stress that these are speculative (all orange); no better than the speculation they replace (and almost equally susceptible to the Joan-Lars-Joseph objection)!
Recall this question

can we turn the argument around?

1. Moral reframing works

therefore:

2. Conservatives differ from liberals in placing more weight on binding foundations and less weight on individualizing foundations.

My view: this argument will only work if there is no other possible explanation for why moral reframing works.

!

‘Why does moral reframing work? The primary explanation is that morally reframed messages are influential because targets perceive a “match” between their moral convictions and the argument’ (Feinberg & Willer, 2019, p. 4).

Why does perceiving a match increase willingness to mitigate climate change?

Feinberg & Willer (2013): because it increases the probability that you will think of climate change as an ethical issue.

And now you can see why those objections matter.
Theoretically, if conservatives give equal weight to harm and purity, framing climate change in terms of purity rather than harm should not change the probability that they will think of climate change as a moral issue.
And if the MFQ-1 questionnaire used in all these surveys is not measurement invariant, then we cannot be sure that conservatives differ from liberals in putting less weight on harm and more weight on purity and authority: in which case they may not be perceiving a greater match at all.

?

puzzle

If the evidence for cultural variation in moral psychology is at best weak,
and if the theoretical argument for moral reframing is flawed,
why does moral reframing seem to work?

The scalar invariance and Lars-et-al puzzles are nicely complementary: if the first fails and the evidence *is* correct, then the second objection gets you.