Singer vs Kamm on Distance

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Singer vs Kamm on Distance

‘the whole way we look at moral issues—our moral conceptual scheme—needs to be altered’

(Singer, 1972, p. 230).

‘if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out [...] It makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor's child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away’

(Singer, 1972, pp. 231–2).

image source: bing AI (gpt-4)

Far Alone

I alone know that in a distant part of a foreign country that I am visiting, many children are drowning, and I alone can save one of them.

To save the one, all I must do is put the $500 I carry in my pocket into a machine that then triggers (via electric current) rescue machinery that will certainly scoop him out’ (Kamm, 2008, p. 348)

You are supposed to intuit that not doing would be monstrously bad in one case, but not as bad in the other case.

‘the whole way we look at moral issues—our moral conceptual scheme—needs to be altered’

(Singer, 1972, p. 230).

1. On reflection, many people judge that not acting in Near Alone is worse than not Acting in Far Alone.

2. The difference in judgements is due to the difference in distance between the agent and the victim.

3. The difference in distance is not morally relevant.

4. Therefore, it is possible to be convinced that there is a morally relevant difference between scenarios even when there is not.

distance ‘can alter our obligation to aid.’

(Kamm, 2008, p. 368)

[1] ‘when we think we have a strong obligation to aid in the Near Alone Case and not in the Far Alone Case, it is the difference in distance [...] that is determinative of the sense of obligation’

(Kamm, 2008, p. 357).

[2] ‘one has a moral prerogative to give greater weight to one’s own interests’

If you use this prerogative, then ‘there is also a duty [...] to take care of what is associated with [you], for example, the area near [you]’

‘the whole way we look at moral issues—our moral conceptual scheme—needs to be altered’

(Singer, 1972, p. 230).

1. On reflection, many people judge that not acting in Near Alone is worse than not Acting in Far Alone.

2. The difference in judgements is due to the difference in distance between the agent and the victim.

3. The difference in distance is not morally relevant.

4. Therefore, it is possible to be convinced that there is a morally relevant difference between scenarios even when there is not.

Nagel & Waldmann (2013, p. figure 1)

Nagel & Waldmann (2013, p. figure 3)

Just to illustrate how the method works. (You have to understand the whole sequence of experiments to fully understand.)

This is about Experiment 4b.

Necessary vs Not-Necessary Conditions crossed with helper is Near or Far from helpee.

Not-Necessary Condition: ‘Since both Victor and the thief are located in a private area that cannot be accessed by everyone (dashed line), it is impossible to walk over to Victor and talk to him directly. The only chance to prevent Victor from being robbed is for someone to immediately send him a text message via cell phone and warn him of the thief. Both Pete and Adam possess a cell phone and Victor’s number.’

Necessary condition. ‘Imagine Pete (circle P) is standing on a huge public place (rectangle). The place is crowded with people (circles). Suddenly, Pete becomes aware that Victor (circle V), a distant acquaintance of his, is standing right next to him [on the other side of the same public place]. Victor is currently talking to someone whom Pete recognizes to be a noto- rious thief (circle T). Victor obviously does not know this, and unless somebody warns him, the thief will take away all his money while they are talking without Victor noticing it. (At the same time, Adam (circle A) is standing on the other side of the same public place [right next to Victor]. Adam is also a distant acquaintance of Victor, and he has also seen Victor and recognized the thief. Adam is thus just as aware of Victor’s critical situation as Pete is.) The only chance to prevent Victor from being robbed is for someone to immediately walk over to him and warn him of the thief.

Figure caption: ‘Mean ratings of sense of obligation in Experiment 4b. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The distance variable refers to the near versus far agent (within subjects).’

‘Apparent distance effects, as demonstrated in previous studies Near Alone and Far Alone cases [...], turned out to be explainable in terms of confounded factors such as

* informational directness (Experiment 2),

* group membership (Experiment 3), or

* relative efficaciousness (Experiment 4b),

Thus, distance loses its intuitive significance for helping obligations when it is isolated from its natural covariates.’

(Nagel & Waldmann, 2013, p. 249)

Near Alone

I am walking past a pond in a foreign country that I am visiting.

I alone see many children drowning in it, and I alone can save one of them.

To save the one, I must put the $500 I have in my pocket into a machine that then triggers (via electric current) rescue machinery that will certainly scoop him out’ (Kamm, 2008, p. 348)

Far Alone

I alone know that in a distant part of a foreign country that I am visiting, many children are drowning, and I alone can save one of them.

To save the one, all I must do is put the $500 I carry in my pocket into a machine that then triggers (via electric current) rescue machinery that will certainly scoop him out’ (Kamm, 2008, p. 348)

‘people might indeed share Kamm’s (2007) intuition that her Near Alone and Far Alone cases differ slightly in the degree of moral obligation they imply. [...]

this difference is not attributable to distance per se

Rather, the difference can be traced back to a confounded factor, namely informational directness

At constant levels of directness, distance ceases to be of moral relevance to people’

(Nagel & Waldmann, 2013, p. 243).

What are the consequences
for Singer and for Kamm?

‘the whole way we look at moral issues—our moral conceptual scheme—needs to be altered’

(Singer, 1972, p. 230).

1. On reflection, many people judge that not acting in Near Alone is worse than not Acting in Far Alone.

2. The difference in judgements is due to the difference in distance between the agent and the victim.

3. The difference in distance is not morally relevant.

4. Therefore, it is possible to be convinced that there is a morally relevant difference between scenarios even when there is not.

Is this a problem for Singer? Not really. He needs another argument, but perhaps he can find one. (Although note that the factors which Nagel and Waldman do find to be efficacious in explaining judgements are hard to identify as clearly morally irrelevant!)

Is this really a problem for Kamm?

‘It may be suggested that proximity matters as a heuristic device that correlates with morally significant factors, though it itself is not morally significant. [...] But *I doubt that* these factors explain the apparent moral significance of distance’ (Kamm, 2008, p. 379, my emphasis).

Recall Kamm’s arguments

distance ‘can alter our obligation to aid.’

(Kamm, 2008, p. 368)

[1] ‘when we think we have a strong obligation to aid
in the Near Alone Case and not in the Far Alone Case, it is the difference in distance [...] that is determinative of the sense of obligation’

(Kamm, 2008, p. 357).

[2] ‘one has a moral prerogative to give greater weight to one’s own interests’

If you use this prerogative, then ‘there is also a duty [...] to take care of what is associated with [you], for example, the area near [you]’

Defender of Kamm could insist that the argument is correct even if people don’t generally judge in that way.

But this seems hard to sustain. After all, the argument is explicitly a response to the false assumption that spatial distance does influence people’s judgements.

So it is hard not to see Kamm’s argument as a post-hoc confabulation. And then you might wonder: if this can happen in the case of distance, should we trust the method in other cases?

My own experience is that when I read Kamm, the argument seem very compelling. But when I think about how this argument went astray, I try to step back and not be influenced by those apparently compelling arguments.

Could scientific discoveries undermine, or support, ethical principles?

Yes,
unless Singer (1972)’s and Kamm (2008)’s
broad approaches are misguided.

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Singer vs Kamm on Distance

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