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Could scientific discoveries
undermine, or support,
ethical principles?

preview

Yes, unless Foot’s approach is entirely wrong.

Foot’s Method of Trolley Cases

‘We are about to give a patient who needs it to save his life a massive dose of a certain drug in short supply. There arrive, however, five other patients each of whom could be saved by one-fifth of that dose.’

May we give the whole dose to the first patient?

We could save the lives of five patients by killing a healthy person and distributing their organs.

May we kill the healthy person?

Why do we say one is permissible (or even required) and the other impermissible?

(Foot, 1967, p. 13).

Answer 1: Because of the doctrine of double effect.

‘it is sometimes permissible to bring about by oblique intention what one may not directly intend.’ (Foot, 1967, p. 7).

‘We are about to give a patient who needs it to save his life a massive dose of a certain drug in short supply. There arrive, however, five other patients each of whom could be saved by one-fifth of that dose.’

May we give the whole dose to the first patient?

We could save the lives of five patients by killing a healthy person and distributing their organs.

May we kill the healthy person?

‘there are five patients in a hospital whose lives could be saved by [making] a certain gas, but that this inevitably releases lethal fumes into the room of another patient whom [...] we are unable to move.’

May we manufacture the gas?

Why do we say one is permissible (or even required) and the other impermissible?

(Foot, 1967, p. 13).

Answer 1: Because of the doctrine of double effect.

‘it is sometimes permissible to bring about by oblique intention what one may not directly intend.’ (Foot, 1967, p. 7).

Answer 2: Because duties not to harm rank higher than duties to help.

‘We are about to give a patient who needs it to save his life a massive dose of a certain drug in short supply. There arrive, however, five other patients each of whom could be saved by one-fifth of that dose.’

May we give the whole dose to the first patient?

‘there are five patients in a hospital whose lives could be saved by the manufacture of a certain gas, but that this inevitably releases lethal fumes into the room of another patient whom [...] we are unable to move.’

May we manufacture the gas?

Why do we say one is permissible (or even required) and the other impermissible?

(Foot, 1967, p. 13).

Answer 1: Because of the doctrine of double effect.

‘it is sometimes permissible to bring about by oblique intention what one may not directly intend.’ (Foot, 1967, p. 7).

Answer 2: Because duties not to harm rank higher than duties to help.

This is an example of Foot’s Method of Trolley Cases.

But there are no trolleys ...

‘My conclusion is that the distinction between direct and oblique intention plays only a quite subsidiary role in determining what we say in these cases, while the distinction between avoiding injury and bringing aid is very important indeed’

(Foot, 1967, p. 12, my emphasis).

facts about what people would judge when presented with particular scenarios

facts about which factors determine why they make those judgements

Well, what have we learned about the facts?
Waldmann, Nagel, & Wiegmann (2012, p. 288) offers a brief summary of some factors which have been considered to influence including:

- whether an agent is part of the danger (e.g. on the trolley) or a bystander;

- whether an action involves forceful contact with a victim;

- whether an action targets an object or the victim;

- how directly the victim’s suffering impinges on the agent; and

- how the victim is described.

‘A brief summary of the research of the past years is that it has been shown that almost all these confounding factors influence judgments, along with a number of others’

(Waldmann et al., 2012, p. 288).

‘My conclusion is that the distinction between direct and oblique intention plays only a quite subsidiary role in determining what we say in these cases, while the distinction between avoiding injury and bringing aid is very important indeed’

(Foot, 1967, p. 12, my emphasis).

‘it seems hopeless to look for the one and only explanation of moral intuitions in dilemmas.
The research suggests that various moral and nonmoral factors interact in the generation of moral judgments about dilemmas’

(Waldmann et al., 2012, p. 290).

It’s not important whether Waldman et al’s findings undermine or support Foot’s positions. What matters for our purposes is that they are clearly relevant.
For our question was ...

Could scientific discoveries
undermine, or support, ethical principles?

conclusion so far

Could scientific discoveries undermine, or support, ethical principles?

Foot’s argument hinges on why people are disposed, on reflection, to make certain patterns of judgements.

Although she relies on guesswork, Foot is concerned with an empirical issue; one which moral psychologists have advanced our understanding of.

So whether or not we reject the Method of Trolley Cases, the answer to our overall question is yet (unless Foot is wrong).
Either moral psychology shows that the Method of Trolley Cases cannot work (which implies a positive answer to our overall question).
or else Foot is right and the Method of Trolley Cases can work, in which case moral psychology makes an essential contribution to its application (which also implies a positive answer to our overall question).