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What Is the Role of Fast Processes In Not-Justified-Inferentially Judgements?

1. Ethical judgements are explained by a dual-process theory, which distinguishes faster from slower processes.

2. Faster processes are unreliable in unfamiliar* situations.

3. Therefore, we should not rely on faster process in unfamiliar* situations.

4. When philosophers rely on not-justified-inferentially premises, they are relying on faster processes.

5. We have reason to suspect that the moral scenarios and principles philosophers consider involve unfamiliar* situations.

6. Therefore, not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios, and debatable principles, cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.

Objection: Research on fast processes is not relevant because philosophers considering moral scenarios are thinking very slowly about them.

Campbell says philosophy is thinking in slow motion.

Observation: Physicists in the Aristotelian tradition were also thinking very slowly about physical scenarios (e.g. those involving the behaviours of objects launched vertically).

Yet their judgements reflect, and relied on, fast processes.

1. Ethical judgements are explained by a dual-process theory, which distinguishes faster from slower processes.

2. Faster processes are unreliable in unfamiliar* situations.

3. Therefore, we should not rely on faster process in unfamiliar* situations.

4. When philosophers rely on not-justified-inferentially premises, they are relying on faster processes.

5. We have reason to suspect that the moral scenarios and principles philosophers consider involve unfamiliar* situations.

6. Therefore, not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios, and debatable principles, cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.

Why was it that people untrained in physics so often predicted a spiral, even though they could not have seen such a thing (because it’s physically impossible)?

McCloskey, Caramazza, & Green (1980, p. figure 2D)

why?

because fast processes make it appear so
(Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001)

Objection: Research on fast processes is not relevant because philosophers considering moral scenarios are thinking very slowly about them.

Campbell says philosophy is thinking in slow motion.

Observation: Physicists in the Aristotelian tradition were also thinking very slowly about physical scenarios (e.g. those involving the behaviours of objects launched vertically).

Yet their judgements reflect, and relied on, fast processes.

(There is no way they could have arrived at the judgements they did if not for the operations of fast processes.)

1. Ethical judgements are explained by a dual-process theory, which distinguishes faster from slower processes.

2. Faster processes are unreliable in unfamiliar* situations.

3. Therefore, we should not rely on faster process in unfamiliar* situations.

4. When philosophers rely on not-justified-inferentially premises, they are relying on faster processes.

5. We have reason to suspect that the moral scenarios and principles philosophers consider involve unfamiliar* situations.

6. Therefore, not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios, and debatable principles, cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.

Heider & Simmel (1944) (redrawn)

Please take a look at this video. What do you see?
[It’s about a minute, don’t need to wait until quite the end.]
I want to contrast two perspectives. On the one hand, many people who see this talk about attacking, rescuing and escaping.
On the other hand, we all know that these are just patterns of light. There are not even any physical objects, and no possibility at all of causal interactions among them of any kind—let alone intentional actions driven by fear or anger.
How do the two perspectives coexist?
It’s a consequence of fast vs slow processes.
Fast processes are based on rough and ready heuristics, and displays like this one are designed to trigger those heuristics through very careful use of kinematics (that is, movements).
You might say, I have the impression of anger but I know that really it’s just light and shaddow.
Now imagine a world in which we had no idea about the true nature of these things.
In that case, you could only go on the basis of your impressions. And your impressions are a consequence of fast processes.
You might reflect at great length on this, puzzling out what is happening and come up with a theory about these life-forms.
But all of that reflection—involving slow processes, of course—is founded on what the fast processes are generating. [stop]

1. Ethical judgements are explained by a dual-process theory, which distinguishes faster from slower processes.

2. Faster processes are unreliable in unfamiliar* situations.

3. Therefore, we should not rely on faster process in unfamiliar* situations.

4. When philosophers rely on not-justified-inferentially premises, they are relying on faster processes.

5. We have reason to suspect that the moral scenarios and principles philosophers consider involve unfamiliar* situations.

6. Therefore, not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios, and debatable principles, cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.

So I am arguing for this premise. But let me continue the argument

So does the fast process directly influence the slow judgement?

No. (Or not significantly.)

fast process -> appearance + high subjective confidence

reflection on appearance -> slow judgement

The fast process provides phenomenal material for slow judgement.

So far I only replied to an objection. I did not give an argument.

But why accept that this is also how

not-justified-inferentially ethical judgements work?

When philosophers rely on not-justified-inferentially premises, are they relying on faster processes?

No. Philosophers are magic.

Yes. Philosophers are like everyone else.

There’s nothing else but the faster processes that could give rise to not-justified-inferentially judgements.

1. Ethical judgements are explained by a dual-process theory, which distinguishes faster from slower processes.

2. Faster processes are unreliable in unfamiliar* situations.

3. Therefore, we should not rely on faster process in unfamiliar* situations.

4. When philosophers rely on not-justified-inferentially premises, they are relying on faster processes.

5. We have reason to suspect that the moral scenarios and principles philosophers consider involve unfamiliar* situations.

6. Therefore, not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios, and debatable principles, cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.