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Ethical Implications of the Dual Process Theory

Recall: dual-process theory
Will recap the argument a bit later; for now just think about the conclusion.

Dual Process Theory of Ethical Abilities (core part)

Two (or more) ethical processes are distinct:
the conditions which influence whether they occur,
and which outputs they generate,
do not completely overlap.

One process makes fewer demands on scarce cognitive resources than the other.

(Terminology: fast vs slow)

Ok, that’s what the theory says. But what does it mean?

1. Ethical judgements are explained by a dual-process theory, which distinguishes faster from slower processes.

2. Faster processes are unreliable in unfamiliar* situations.

3. Therefore, we should not rely on faster process in unfamiliar* situations.

4. When philosophers rely on not-justified-inferentially premises, they are relying on faster processes.

5. We have reason to suspect that the moral scenarios and principles philosophers consider involve unfamiliar* situations.

6. Therefore, not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios, and debatable principles, cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.

But let me remind you briefly of what seems to follow from the dual-process theory ...

negative: object to arguments against consequentialism

positive : support for consequentialism

image source: bing ai = https://www.bing.com/images/create/utilitarianism/1-65e5be78fd3d4129bfb292f46d24aaff?id=judaBO2J2PsIDo7s5%2FokPQ.eIuJQLEy4KdpH75OADAPrQ&view=detailv2&idpp=genimg&idpclose=1&thid=OIG4.X3Kiy4bz6zlM6nMFYloS&form=SYDBIC

‘the chief weapons of opponents of utilitarianism have been examples intended to show that the dictates of utilitarianism clash with moral intuitions that we all share’

(Singer, 2005, p. 343)

Against Consequentialism

Many spontaneously judge that we should not Drop.

Therefore:

We should not Drop.

Consequentialism* implies we should Drop.

Therefore:

Consequentialism* is wrong.

Drop

\emph{Drop}

Mary [...] notices an empty boxcar rolling out of control. [...] anyone it hits will die. [...] If Mary does nothing, the boxcar will hit the five people on the track. If Mary pulls a lever it will release the bottom of the footbridge and [...] one person will fall onto the track, where the boxcar will hit the one person, slow down because of the one person, and not hit the five people farther down the track.

Pulling the lever is: [extremely morally good:::neither good nor bad:::extremely morally bad]

This is what Singer and Greene, by quite different arguments, aim to show is wrong.

negative: object to arguments against consequentialism

positive : support for consequentialism

Not saying that the arguments are successful, but they seem cogent and worth examining further. (Perhaps in an essay.)

1. Slow processes are consequentialist.

2. Slow is better than fast when there is disagreement.

Therefore:

3. Consequentialism is true

(I think Greene writes this somewhere) : often better to trust the fast processes, especially in familiar situations. (Reason can take you to some quite wild places.)
> ‘my point is simply that act consequentialism should get points for > not chasing intuitions and that some of its competitors [...] should lose points for doing so. > Note that the > present argument also casts doubt on theories that, rather than chasing > intuitions with codifying principles, simply allow our intuitions roam free. > Likewise, it casts doubt on theories that purport to derive from first > principles, but that are in fact intuition chasing—that is, theories that > are actually attempts to get from first principles to the intuitively > right answers rather than attempts to get from first principles to wherever > those principles happen to lead. (And, if you’re like me, you suspect that > this covers most, if not all, of act consequentialism’s competition.)’ > (Greene, 2014, p. 725)

(not one of Greene’s arguments)

negative: object to arguments against consequentialism

positive : support for consequentialism

another try

1. ‘Most, if not all, of act consequentialism’s competition’ relies on premises that are not-justified-inferentially

2. Consequentialism does not rely on any such premises

Therefore:

3. Consequentialism is true

compare Greene (2014, p. 725)

> ‘my point is simply that act consequentialism should get points for > not chasing intuitions and that some of its competitors [...] should lose points for doing so. > Note that the > present argument also casts doubt on theories that, rather than chasing > intuitions with codifying principles, simply allow our intuitions roam free. > Likewise, it casts doubt on theories that purport to derive from first > principles, but that are in fact intuition chasing—that is, theories that > are actually attempts to get from first principles to the intuitively > right answers rather than attempts to get from first principles to wherever > those principles happen to lead. (And, if you’re like me, you suspect that > this covers most, if not all, of act consequentialism’s competition.)’ > (Greene, 2014, p. 725)
What is wrong with this argument?

negative: object to arguments against consequentialism

positive : support for consequentialism

I do not find an argument that works. This does not mean that there is not one.