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‘participants in the time-pressure condition, relative to the no-time-pressure condition, were more likely to give ‘‘no’’ responses in high-conflict dilemmas’
(Suter \& Hertwig, 2011, p. 456).
 
‘The model detected a significant effect of time pressure, p = .03 (see Table 1), suggesting that the slope of utilitarian responses was steeper for participants under time pressure. As is visually clear in Figure 4, participants under time pressure gave less utilitarian responses than control par- ticipants to scenarios featuring low kill–save ratios, but reached the same rates of utilitarian responses for the highest kill–save ratios.’ (Trémolière \& Bonnefon, 2014, p. 927)
 
\textbf{*todo*} [save for later, more drama: [also mention (Gawronski, Conway, Armstrong, Friesdorf, \& Hütter, 2018) p.~1006 ‘reinterpreation’ and p.~992 descriptive vs mechanistsic]] Gawronski \& Beer (2017, p. 669) argue for an alternative interpretation: The central findings of Trémolière \& Bonnefon (2014) ‘show that outcomes did influence moral judgments, but only when participants were under cognitive load or time pressure (i.e., the white bars do not significantly differ from the gray bars within the low load and no time pressure condi- tions, but they do significantly differ within the high load and time pressure conditions). Thus, a more appro- priate interpretation of these data is that cognitive load and time pressure increased utilitarian responding, which stands in stark contrast to the widespread assumption that utilitarian judgments are the result of effortful cognitive processes (Greene et al., 2008; Suter \& Hertwig, 2011).
 

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