Conflicting Evidence against a Dual-Process Theory of Moral Judgement

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Conflicting Evidence against a Dual-Process Theory of Moral Judgement

aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

evidence against the auxiliary hypothesis

aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

Suter & Hertwig, 2011 : yes

Suter & Hertwig, 2011 figure 1

caption: ‘Fig. 1. Average proportion of deontological responses separately for conditions and type of moral dilemma (high- versus low-conflict personal and impersonal dilemmas) with data combined across the fast (i.e., time- pressure and self-paced-intuition) and slow conditions (no-time-pressure and self-paced-deliberation) in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. Error bars represent standard errors. Only responses to high-conflict dilemmas differed significantly between the conditions’

‘participants in the time-pressure condition, relative to the no-time-pressure condition, were more likely to give ‘‘no’’ responses in high-conflict dilemmas’

(Suter & Hertwig, 2011, p. 456).

aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

Suter & Hertwig, 2011 : yes

Bago & de Neys, 2019 : no

another study: conflicting evidence

‘Submarine (4/60)

You are responsible for the mission of a submarine [...] leading [...] from a control center on the beach. An onboard explosion has [...] collapsed the only access corridor between the upper and lower levels of the ship. [...] water is quickly approaching to the upper level of the ship. If nothing is done, 12 [extreme:60] people in the upper level will be killed.

[...] the only way to save these people is to hit a switch in which case the path of the water to the upper level will be blocked and it will enter the lower level of the submarine instead.

However, you realize that your brother and 3 other people are trapped in the lower level. If you hit the switch, your brother along with the 3 other people in the lower level (who otherwise would survive) will die [...]

Would you hit the switch?’

(Bago & De Neys, 2019, p. supplementary materials)

Bago & de Neys, 2019 supplementary materials

there's also an impersonal case where it's not your brother

first response under time pressure and cognitive load

second response under neither

aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

let's think about what our predictions might be

What can we predict?

prediction: first response will be less influenced by outcomes than the second

Because they did not vary the outcomes, this is tricky. (Save for later.)

the prediction would be that the first response will not take into account the live saved in the same way that the second response will (because you think of switching the water as more immediately killing)

First response vs second response.

Bago & de Neys, 2019 table 2

so first of all how many people are giving what they're calling a utilitarian response to both first and second time they're asked

now how many people are doing the opposite so they're consistently not pressing the switch both responses

now this is the pattern we're not expecting so what's happening here is that people are under time pressure and cognitive load saying gosh you know what i'm going to save the large number of people but then switching and saying actually i'm not going to press the switch after all now that's exactly the opposite of what we'd expect

Study 1: lots of consequentialist responses (= U)

Finally, here's what we might be expecting if the auxiliary hypothesis is true these people who first of all are saying that i'm not going to press the switch and then they're like oh actually i've got a bit more time on reflection probably going to save more people sorry about the folks in the lower deck and that's about 11%

Can also compute ‘noncorrection’ rate for those responses whihc ended D (ie. DD/(UD+DD)). In this study it’s 69.3% I.e. proportion of switchers *to* D was higher than proportion of switchers to U!

Study 2: few consequentialist responses (= U) But still reversals are few.

Can also compute ‘noncorrection’ rate for those responses whihc ended D (ie. DD/(UD+DD)). Overall for all studies it’s 84.2% I.e. proportion of switchers *to* D was only 0.4% lower than to U!

‘Our critical finding is that although there were some instances in which deliberate correction occurred, these were the exception rather than the rule. Across the studies, results consistently showed that in the vast majority of cases in which people opt for a [consequentialist] response after deliberation, the [consequentialist] response is already given in the initial phase’

(Bago & De Neys, 2019, p. 1794).

Bago & de Neys, 2019 p. 1794

Objection 1: consistency effects? No!

they consider this response and they note this in a pilot study they found that in one of the dilemmas they got roughly speaking 85 percent who when asked just once were giving a consequentialist response

so they're asked once they give a consequentialist response in the main study when people ask twice they find the same 84 roughly percent giving the consequentialist response right away

so it looks like if we were looking for consistency effects here we would expect that the proportion of people giving a consequentialist response would change when they were asked the question twice versus when they were just asked asked it once but it doesn't seem to have an effect there

‘a potential consistency confound in the two-response paradigm. That is, when people are asked to give two consecutive responses, they might be influenced by a desire to look consistent [...] However, in our one-response pretest we observed 85.4% [...] of [consequentialist] responses on the conflict versions. This is virtually identical to the final [consequentialist] response rate of 84.5% [...] in our main two-response study (see main results).’

Objection 2: No influence of fast process?

Note that the dilemma is quite lengthy. People have to read and understand the dilemma before they can finally decide. But it is possible that, in reading and understanding it, they are also already making up their minds. In that case, there is no effect of time pressure because people have plenty of time to decide their response in advance. This would explain why few participants change their responses at all.

I belive this is a good objection, but there is a problem ...

The problem is that Suter & Hertwig, 2011 claim to find an effect of time pressure with a similar design! So if we make this objection to Bago & de Neys, 2019, then the evidence of Suter & Hertwig, 2011 appears to contradict it.

(This is a tricky argument because of course if we accept Bago & de Neys, 2019 then we have contradicted Suter & Hertwig, 2011 anyway. Still, we can use the premise that Suter & Hertwig, 2011 is correct as a kind of reductio for this objection.)

aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

Suter & Hertwig, 2011 : yes

Bago & de Neys, 2019 : no

Check you understand. Thoughts about a possible resolution?

aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

Wait. Isn’t this too quick!

Evidence Greene (2014) cites includes:

Suter & Hertwig (2011)
Trémolière & Bonnefon (2014)
Conway & Gawronski (2013)

Saw this last time.

Conway & Gawronsky 2013, figure 1

if you don't give a utilitarian response it doesn't follow automatically that you're going to give a rule-based or deontological response

this is the brilliant thing about them (that bago and denise for some reason are missing they don't seem to take this on board)

it may also be that you give a response might be neither utilitarianism nor dentological

but look at how they conceptualized this neither utilitarian nor deontologial response.

Note that if we just provide ‘incongruent’ dilemmas, we cannot distinguish all the different possibilities.

This is why varying the outcomes (which we do between congruent and incongruent dilemmas) is so important.

conway and goronski conceptualized neither being a consequentialist nor deontologist as basically just harming in every case

‘incongruent dilemma’ : kill one to save five lives (consequentialism says yes, deontology says no)

‘congruent dilemma’ : kill one to prevent a paint bomb from going off (consequentialism and deontology both say no)

Maybe people just prefer not to act when under time pressure?

here's a reasonable thought: it's not that i'm just going to harm people regardless right it might be that i'm neither going to be utilitarian nor al because the right thing to do if i'm under a lot of time pressure and the stakes are high is simply to hold back and don't act

Conway & Gawronsky 2013, figure 1

Gawronski et al, 2017 figure 1

They call this new model the CNI (consequences norms and inaction) model

Note that adding a possibility causes a doubling in the number of dilemmas you need. Process dissciation is hard because dilemmas grow exponentially as you add factors.

Gawronski et al, 2017 figure 4

What goronski and colleagues did was indeed just that so they tested the sensitivity to consequences ('C parameter') sensitivity norms ('N parameter') and tendency to be inactive ('I parameter')

changing the load with the more advanced model gave us a different result from conway and goronsky what they found essentially was that low versus high low did not change sensitivity to consequences significantly did not and you can see if anything it's going the wrong direction here oops no sorry it's going in the right direction but there's no significant difference it did not change sensitivity to norms at all that's also what conway and goronsky found no surprises there the significance difference was only people's tendency to inaction

so what goronski and colleagues found is that the difference between that low load and the high load seems to be explained by this idea that when you're under high load you prefer not to act at all they put it like this the only significant effect in these studies was a significant increase in participants general preference for inaction as a result of they said did not affect participants sensitivity to morally relevant consequences

‘The only significant effect in these studies was a significant increase in participants’ general preference for inaction as a result of cognitive load. Cognitive load did not affect participants’ sensitivity to morally relevant consequences’

(Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf, & Hütter, 2017, p. 363).

‘cognitive load influences moral dilemma judgments by enhancing the omission bias, not by reducing sensitivity to consequences in a utilitarian sense’

(Gawronski et al., 2017, p. 363).

‘Instead of reducing participants’ sensitivity to consequences in a utilitarian sense, cognitive load increased participants’ general preference for inaction. ’

(Gawronski et al., 2017, p. 365).

Gawronski et al, 2017 p. 363

Evidence Greene (2014) cites includes:

Suter & Hertwig (2011)
Trémolière & Bonnefon (2014)
Conway & Gawronski (2013)

aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

Suter & Hertwig, 2011 : yes

Bago & de Neys, 2019 : no

Can we resolve the apparent contradiction by preference for inaction under time-pressure?

I don’t see how. Both studies used nonconsequentialist = deontological. So any preference for inaction under time-pressure should have had the same effect in both studies!

These studies’ results appear to confict (time-pressure does/doesn't make people less consequentialist)

These studies’ results appear to confict (time-pressure has barely any effect / does make people less consequentialist [because prefer inaction])

aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

Too early to give up on the dual-process theory altogether. We have no better account. But we should not be confident in the auxiliary hypothesis.

more research is needed?

What, if anything, can we conclude despite the mixed evidence?

Why is there an apparently conflicting pattern of findings?

dual-process theory of

judgement (e.g. risk)

no simple rule about their limits

fast processes use a variety of heuristics

are these even different theories?

more research is needed?

What, if anything, can we conclude despite the mixed evidence?

Why is there an apparently conflicting pattern of findings?

On balance, it seems reasonable to

(i) deviate from the mainstream in not accepting any auxiliary hypothesis as firmly established while

aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

On balance, it seems reasonable to

(i) deviate from the mainstream in not accepting any auxiliary hypothesis as firmly established while

(ii) provisionally accepting, in line with the mainstream, that the stripped dual-process theory will turn out to be true.

more research is needed?

What, if anything, can we conclude despite the mixed evidence?

Why is there an apparently conflicting pattern of findings?

Over to you: potentially great essay opportunities ...

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Conflicting Evidence against a Dual-Process Theory of Moral Judgement

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