Appendix: Dual Process Theory and Auxiliary Hypotheses

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Appendix: Dual Process Theory and Auxiliary Hypotheses

1. Ethical judgements are explained by a dual-process theory, which distinguishes faster from slower processes.

2. Faster processes are unreliable in unfamiliar* situations.

3. Therefore, we should not rely on faster process in unfamiliar* situations.

4. When philosophers rely on not-justified-inferentially premises, they are relying on faster processes.

5. We have reason to suspect that the moral scenarios and principles philosophers consider involve unfamiliar* situations.

6. Therefore, not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios, and debatable principles, cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.

Dual Process Theory of Ethical Abilities (core part)

Two (or more) ethical processes are distinct:
the conditions which influence whether they occur,
and which outputs they generate,
do not completely overlap.

One process makes fewer demands on scarce cognitive resources than the other.

(Terminology: fast vs slow)

Ok, that’s what the theory says.

Why do we need auxiliary hypotheses?

Because nearly all of the evidence is linked to measurements of a single response and the core idea doesn’t generate readily testable, distinctive predictions without a further hypothesis about what kinds of models underpin the processes.

For example, what should we predict if we increase time-pressure?

Compare physical cognition:

faster* processes :always characteristically Impetus (errors aside)

slower* processes : sometimes characteristically Newtonian

auxiliary hypotheses : a closer look

‘The Central Tension Principle:

Characteristically deontological judgments are preferentially supported by automatic emotional responses processes, while characteristically consequentialist judgments are preferentially supported by conscious reasoning and allied processes of cognitive control’

(Greene, 2014, p. 699)

Greene, 2014 p. 699

This is sloppy

What does this mean?

‘unless you’re prepared to say “yes” to the footbridge case, your automatic settings are still running the show’

(Greene, 2014, p. 723)

Greene, 2014 p. 723

not consequentialist responses are always a consequence of the fast process

Deontologists use reason too.

Actually I'm not sure what this means, so I’m not sure about my interpretation of Greene

Compare:

faster* processes :always characteristically Impetus (errors aside)

slower* processes : sometimes characteristically Newtonian

candidate auxiliary hypotheses

fast	slow	source
never consequentialist	sometimes consequentialist	Greene (2014)
always deontological	sometimes not deontological	Greene (2014)
always only act-types	sometimes not only act-types	Cushman (2013)
never (distal) outcomes	sometimes (distal) outcomes	Cushman (2013)
model-free	model-based	Cushman (2013)
affective	cognitive	Greene (2014)

Note that these are separable claims.

I link this one best.

aux. hypothesis: only the slow process ever flexibly and rapidly takes into account differences in the outcomes of an action

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Appendix: Dual Process Theory and Auxiliary Hypotheses

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